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COMMENTARY on RE L    
 
 
Context  
The context for Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact: Domestic 
Violence); Re M (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) 
[2000] 2 FLR 334 (Re L) was complex: the case brought into focus – and was also 
precipitated by – several developments in the previous decades. First, as Felicity 
Kaganas noted in her commentary on the Re L case, there had been a ‘growing 
recognition by academics, policy makers, legislators and the judiciary of the risks 
posed to women by domestic violence’.1  However, there was also growing evidence 
that increasing awareness of domestic violence amongst professionals in the family 
justice system was not automatically leading to a change in practice.2  Some of the 
reluctance, particularly amongst mediators and family court welfare officers, appeared 
to stem from fear of undermining an agreed settlement or of encouraging allegations.3 
Other barriers were that lawyers over-estimated their ability to ‘pick up’ a client’s 
history of domestic violence.4
 Secondly, and very importantly in the context of the family courts and contact 
cases, where the welfare of the child must be the court’s paramount consideration, the 
last two decades of the 20th century had also witnessed widespread concern about 
  There was, therefore a need for a clear unequivocal 
judicial line on the importance of screening for, and taking account of, domestic 
violence. 
                                                 
1 Kaganas, F.  ‘Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re M 
(Contact: Domestic Violence); Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] CFLQ 311. The 
policy concern was evident, for example, in the Home Office publication Living without Fear  
(1999) and in the enactment of s11(4)(d) of the Family Law Act 1996 which, if implemented, 
would have mandated the court to have regard to ‘any risk to the child attributable to’ a person 
living in the child’s (proposed) home. See also Hester, M. and Radford, L. (1996) Domestic 
Violence and Child Contact Arrangements in England and Denmark, Bristol: Policy Press.  
2 See Kaganas, F. and Piper, C. ‘Divorce and Domestic Violence’ in S. Day Sclater and C. 
Piper (eds) Undercurrents of Divorce, (1999) Ashgate, especially p.199.  
3 Hester, M., Pearson, M. and Radford, L. (1997) Domestic Violence, A National Survey of 
Court Welfare and Voluntary Sector Mediation Practice, Bristol: Policy Press.  
4 Piper, C. and Kaganas, F. (1997) ‘The Family Law Act 1996 s1(d): How will “they” know 
there is a risk of violence?’ Child and Family Law Quarterly vol 9(3) 279-89.  
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divorce and separation and the harm it was believed to be causing children. This led to 
a focus on how to maintain the 'separated but continuing' family after parental 
separation,5 with continuing contact seen as the key to presenting families as 
‘unbroken’. This approach was supported by reference to research which suggested 
that conflict was deleterious to children’s development and that ‘good’ parents came to 
agreed settlements, preferably via mediation. Parents wishing to use the courts to 
oppose contact therefore risked being labelled as ‘bad’.6
 Thirdly, research pre-Re L issue was suggesting that ‘violence continues and 
even escalates after separation and that child abuse is associated with woman abuse’.
  
7  
This made clear, at least to feminist lawyers, that the decisions and reasoning in 
contact cases reaching the appeal courts were pivotal for the bringing together of these 
research insights if law was to protect both women and children after divorce or 
parental separation.8
 However, to achieve a higher public profile for the dangers of contact in the 
context of domestic violence was not easy in the 1990s: that decade also witnessed the 
vast amount of media coverage and public discussion given to the question of non-
resident father contact (or rather lack of contact) with his children after parental 
separation.
  
9 Further, both in relation to separated parents and lone mothers, law and 
policy began to focus on the importance, sometimes an over-riding importance, of the 
father as a positive influence on the child and, in particular, the importance for the 
child’s present and future welfare of the child’s awareness of, and contact with, her 
genetic father.10
                                                 
5 Kaganas, F. (1999) ‘Contact, conflict and risk’ in S. Day Sclater and C. Piper (eds) 
Undercurrents of Divorce, Aldershot: Ashgate.  
 These public discussions were untrammelled by any reference to fully 
proven ‘facts’. 
6 B Neale and C Smart, ‘“Good” and “bad” lawyers? Struggling in the Shadow of the Law’ 
(1997) 19(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 377-402; see, also, Cantwell, B. and 
Scott, S. (1995) ‘Children’s wishes, children’s burdens’ JSW&Fam Law. 17(3), 377.. 
7 Kaganas (2000) n 1 above; see also Mullender, A. and Morley, R. (eds), Children Living with 
Domestic Violence: Putting Men's Abuse of Women on the Child Care Agenda (1994) London: 
Whiting and Birch; O'Hara, M., "Domestic Violence and Child Abuse - Making the Links" 
Childright (1992) No. 88, 4-5.  
8 See, for example, Humphreys, C. (1999) ‘Judicial alienation syndrome – failures to respond 
to post-separation violence’ Family Law 29, 313-16.  
9 See, for example, F. Kaganas ‘Domestic Violence, Men’s Groups and the Equivalence 
Argument’ in A. Diduck and K. O’Donovan (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Family Law, 
(2006) Glasshouse, Cavendish: London.  
10 Reflected for example in a change of case law relating to allowing blood tests to establish 
paternity; see J. Fortin, (1999) ‘Is Blood Really Thicker than Water? Re D’ [1999] CFLQ 435.  
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 There were two reasons for this ‘ungrounded’ debate. First, the family courts 
always sat in private in order to protect the children involved11 and so the facts of 
contested cases were not known – only the version publicised by the ‘unsuccessful’ 
non-resident parents. Secondly, family lawyers and mediators12  had imbibed, and then 
found very useful as a tool in seeking agreed settlements between parents in conflict 
over contact, the general gist of research which suggested that contact was beneficial 
for children. Judicial decisions were justified with reference to the ‘obvious’ good of 
contact for children such that there appeared to be a judicial presumption that contact 
would be ordered. Research suggested that what resulted was a lack of detailed 
analysis as to whether contact was beneficial for a particular child.13
 By the time that the judgement was given in Re L, however, these assumptions 
about the welfare of the child were beginning to be questioned. In her new judgement 
Kaganas draws attention to the article written by the then Hale, J. in 1999 (‘The view 
from Court 45’
  
14) which pointed out the lack of clear research evidence for the benefits 
of a child’s contact with a non-resident parent. Rodgers and Pryor similarly challenged 
the assumption that children are generally harmed by divorce15 and Wall J had chaired 
a committee that issued a Consultation paper on contact in cases where there is 
domestic violence.16   Academics were also beginning to point out that strong 
adherence to the assumption that contact is beneficial was leading the courts to 
‘explain’ parental opposition to contact as implacable (unreasonable) hostility and a 
child’s reluctance to stay overnight with a non-residential father  as ‘the result of 
deliberate alienation by the other parent’.17
                                                 
11 However, since 27 April 2009 the press have been allowed to attend hearings if permitted to 
do so by the judge: see Practice Direction: Attendance of Media Representatives at Hearings 
in Family Proceedings - High Court and County Courts, 20th April 2009, Sir Mark Potter, P.  
 
12 See, for example, M King ‘Being Sensible: Images and Practices of the New Family 
Lawyer’ (1999) Journal of Social Policy vol 28, 249-273; Piper, C. ‘How Do You Define a 
Family Lawyer?’ Legal Studies (1999) vol 19(1) 93-111. 
13 See, for example, Piper, C. The Responsible Parent: A Study of Divorce Mediation, (1993) 
Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead; Rhoades, H. (2002) “The ‘No Contact Mother': 
Reconstructions of Motherhood in the Era of the 'New Father’” International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 16(1) 71-94.  
14 Child and Family Law Quarterly [1999] Vol 11(4) 377-386.  
15 Rodgers, B. and Pryor, J. (1998) Divorce and Separation: The Outcomes for Children, York: 
Joseph Rowntree Trust.  
16 Advisory Board on Family Law (2000) Children Act Sub-Committee A Report to the Lord 
Chancellor on Contact between Children and Violent Parents, London: TSO. 
17 Piper, C. ‘Assumptions About Children’s Best Interests’ Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law (2000) vol 22(3) pp 261-276; see also Davis, G. and Pearce, J. (1999) ‘The 
welfare principle in action’ Family Law 29, 144-8.  
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The specific legal context can be found in case law from 1992 to 1998. In re H 
(Minors) (Access) [1992] 1 FLR 148, Balcombe LJ had stated (at 152) that only 
"cogent reasons" would justify not awarding a contact order order, in Re W (A Minor) 
(Contact) [1994] 2 FLR 441 Sir Stephen Brown stated "It is quite clear that contact with a 
parent is a fundamental right of a child, save in wholly exceptional circumstances" (at 
447) and  In re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124 Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR re-asserted (at 128) the presumption that contact was ‘almost always’ in 
the child's interests. Further, where potentially weighty reasons for no contact were 
presented to the court the response might still be an order for supervised or indirect 
contact with insufficient investigation of the benefit or safety of such measures.  
Pre Re L case law  
 However, two years before the Re L judgment Wall J had posed the question 
which explicitly brought together the presumption of contact and the growing concern 
about domestic violence.18 He asked whether it would be in the best interests of 
children ‘to impose an order for contact on a mother who is caring for them well in 
favour of a father who has treated her with such violence as to give her good and valid 
reasons to oppose contact?’.19 His answer was that ‘as a matter of principle, domestic 
violence of itself cannot constitute a bar to contact. Each case must inevitably be 
decided on its facts. Domestic violence can only be one factor in a very complex 
equation.’  Nevertheless, in several other cases at this time Wall J questioned the 
presumption of contact in cases of violence.20
 Wall J’s approach therefore paved the way for change and the decision in Re L, 
in the light of the evidence presented in the consultation and subsequent report,
 
21
                                                 
18 In the case of In re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [1998] 2 FLR 42. 
 had 
the potential to give more weight to the effects of domestic abuse when evaluating the 
best interests of the child. It could also define domestic violence more widely to 
include the long and short term effects of the child witnessing emotional or physical 
abuse, the potential harm to the child via the effect of abuse on the child’s mother and 
her capacity to parent, and the potential harm of continuing contact with an 
19 Ibid at p.56. 
20 See Kaganas n 1 above at 312.  
21 Advisory Board on Family Law (2000) fn 17 above. 
Comment [F1]: Change? 
 5 
inappropriate role model. Further, some commentators had argued for a presumption 
against contact to be established in these circumstances.22
 
  
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the original Re L case 
 Re L did bring change. In line with the recommendations of the Report of the 
Advisory Board on Family Law23
 Butler-Sloss P then specifically noted that the welfare checklist - a list of 
factors which the court must consider when determining the best interest of the child - 
should be applied, and that it should be used in the light of the expert report compiled 
by Drs Sturge and Glaser on the wide ranging direct and indirect effects of domestic 
violence on children. The court could then come to a decision as to whether contact 
should be denied. The court would, therefore, need to balance factors for and against 
contact in relation to the child in question.  
 the court limited the operation of the ‘presumption’ 
in favour of contact. Indeed, Thorpe LJ preferred the word ‘assumption’ as, he said, a 
presumption could impede the court’s assessment of welfare. Butler-Sloss P set out a 
new approach for the courts which entailed, first, investigating and adjudicating on 
allegations of violence. To have any effect, however, an allegation had to be 
substantiated by proof of past violence. The court did not appear to attach significance 
to the risk of future harm, an astonishing omission given the Family Division’s 
concern with future risk in child protection cases.  
 The judges agreed that domestic violence was not a bar to contact. At most, 
domestic violence, and possibly a few other considerations, could ‘offset’ the 
‘assumption’ in favour of contact.  Further, the judgment of Butler-Sloss P can be read 
as being limited to a narrow definition of domestic violence24 despite the availability in 
2000 of evidence justifying a wider definition. Thorpe LJ also stated that ‘the ability of 
the offending parent to recognise his or her past conduct, to be aware of the need for 
change and to make genuine efforts to do so, will be likely to be an important 
consideration’.25
 
  
                                                 
22 See, for example, Hester, M. and Radford, L. (1996) Domestic Violence and Child Contact 
Arrangements in England and Denmark, Policy Press. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Kaganas n 1 above, pp 316-7.  
25 [2000] FLR 334 at 244A.  
Comment [F2]: Considerations? 
Parental problems? 
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The new judgment successfully sought to respond to the shortcomings of the original 
judgment in the ways outlined below.  
The revised judgment  
 
1. The new judgment states that the courts should determine all cases with 
reference to the checklist rather than the assumption that contact is beneficial.  
2. The judgement queries - in the light of research evidence - the appropriateness 
of the assumption that contact is in the child’s best interests when the context is 
that of a contested and highly conflictual case where contact is likely to be 
accompanied by circumstances upsetting to the child. Instead the revised 
judgment states that where the court decides that there has been domestic abuse 
or there is a risk of significant future harm, the court should assume that there 
will be no contact. Such an assumption could be displaced only by sufficient 
and weighty factors in favour of contact. Further, that the expressed desire of 
an abusing father to attend a course and/or to ‘change’ will not constitute such 
a factor. Only evidence of actual change should be weighed in the balance. 
3. The judgment adopts a broader definition of domestic violence than that 
evidenced in the original judgments. It also upholds the idea promoted in the 
Sturge and Glaser report that the use of domestic violence by one parent 
against another is a ‘failure’ in parenting and makes much clearer that the 
courts should take this failure into account.  
4. The judgement also makes clearer the court’s view that the so-called parental 
alienation syndrome and also the notion of ‘implacable hostility’ are not 
‘conditions’ and are based on assumptions not supported by research. The 
judgement refers to research which was available at the time of Re L and could 
have been used to support different arguments.  
5. Kaganas further argues that the focus on the mother as ‘the problem’ is a social 
and judicial construction which should be challenged. Instead she suggests that 
the problems on which the courts should focus are the parental relationship, the 
parenting capacity of the non-resident parent, and the effect of diminishing 
(further) the parenting capacity of the resident parent by continued contact with 
the perpetrator of abuse.  
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6. Finally, the judgment gives a detailed explanation of what would count as 
adequate evidence not only for the purpose of establishing that domestic 
violence has taken place but also for establishing a risk of future harm. 
 
 
Subsequent developments 
Factual findings of harm 
The Re L case was important in that it ensured domestic abuse became an important 
issue in the context of contact. Best practice guidance was issued in 200226
  
 and, more 
recently, detailed guidance for the courts has been issued in the form of Practice 
Directions in 2008 and 2009. The fact-finding process is now detailed and established. 
However, the process is one which abusing parents can also use to produce counter 
allegations and depends too heavily on evidence of past harm.  
No presumption against contact 
The judgements in Re L did not follow the recommendation of the Sturge and Glaser 
report and create a presumption against contact. Nor did they consider sufficiently the 
issue of the harm caused to children by the conflict surrounding court cases. There is 
still an assumption to be offset – to be rebutted by proven evidence of violence and by 
an ‘amount’ of violence which weights the welfare balance against contact. Further the 
change of nomenclature to ‘assumption’ was inadequate to prevent a narrow - or non-
existent - use of the welfare checklist.   
   
The ‘hostility’ of, and ‘alienation’ by, the mother 
The original judgement stated that parental alienation syndrome (PAS) was not a 
‘condition’, but that was insufficient clarification to prevent references to the 
syndrome which might obscure legitimate reasons for parental opposition to contact. 
For example, the Court of Appeal in Re C (Prohibition on Further Applications) 
[2002] EWCA Civ 292 did not appear to have explicitly denied the existence of PAS.27
                                                 
26 See, for example, Advisory Board on Family Law Children Act Sub-Committee (2002) 
Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Question of Parental Contact in Cases where there is 
Domestic Violence, London: HMSO, section 5: ‘Guidelines for Good Practice on Parental 
Contact in cases where there is Domestic Violence’.  
 
27 For example, ‘I would say to Mr. C that his view of the significance of parental alienation 
syndrome may have obscured other more obvious indicators that M herself is giving’ (per Lord 
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 ‘Implacable hostility’ was also still used in contact cases after the judgement in 
2000 with results potentially detrimental to the child concerned. For example in Re C 
(Residence Order) [2008] 1FLR 211  – which in parts reads more like a marketing 
exercise for the Family Division than a reasoned judgment - an order was made 
transferring residence from the mother to the father. Ward LJ endorsed the two main 
reasons apparently given by the judge – that the mother’s opposition to contact ‘was 
intractable’ and that ‘Her failing as a mother was to isolate this little girl’.28 He noted 
that the judgement was ‘predicated on a basis that restoration of the relation between L 
and her father would be in L’s best interest. It plainly would be so.’ 29
 The case was referred back for outstanding questions to be resolved, including 
‘contact for the mother, if she wants it’
  Yet at that point 
it was not plain: L had a close relationship with her half brother, there was a ‘very 
strong bond’ with her mother, her father was ‘a virtual stranger’ to her and there was 
no discussion of the ‘isolation’ factor.  
30 but there was no urging of such contact or 
discussion of the harm to the child stemming from lack of contact with that parent. 
What there was, however, was the following extraordinary statement: ‘[W] eek after 
week fathers come to this court protesting that the court is powerless to enforce its 
orders … even though the long-term damage to the child is perfectly obvious … This 
time the boot is on the other foot, and if a different conclusion has been reached in this 
case then let it be shouted out from the rooftops’.31
  
 
Constructions of mothers and fathers 
Re L left the court with discretion to continue to give considerable ‘positive’ weight to 
the perpetrator’s promises to attend classes and amend his behaviour.32
                                                                                                                                             
Justice Thorpe at para 14). See also T. Hobbs ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome and the UK 
Family Courts - The Dilemma’ [2002] Fam Law 381 at p.386. 
 The resulting 
detriment to the mother can be seen clearly in the recent case of Re P (Children) 
[2008] EWCA Civ 1431 in which domestic violence on the part of the father had been 
proven in the lower court and the 8 year old had told the reporter that when his father 
28 At 215 (see also para 21).  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at p.218, para 31. 
31 Ibid at p. 217, para 26. 
32 Admittedly there was little research evidence by 2000 about the shortcomings of 
programmes for spouse-abusers but the point is still valid that the courts put too much weight 
on verbal assurances of attendance and also on the utility of such.  
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shouts or smacks him 'I curl up and get small and hide my face’.33 Attendance at an 
anger management course for the father was endorsed by Ward LJ who stated that the 
father could then ‘explain his feelings of anger and bitterness at this whole horrible six 
years of unhappiness, from the day the marriage broke down, his being removed from 
the home, the constant difficulties over the children. It is enough to make any ordinary 
man just a little bit angry, but that anger has to be contained’.34 Such a statement 
exudes sympathy rather than condemnation and, moreover, fits uneasily with the 
further requirement that the mother, although the judge had found that she was not 
suffering from a mental disorder, 35 undergo some form of therapy and counselling 
‘which might go some little way to assuaging the father's implacable conviction that 
she is a woman with severe mental problems such as spill over to the detriment of his 
children’.36
 
  
Indirect and supervised contact 
Finally, the original judgment did not give sufficient attention to the problematic 
nature of indirect and supervised contact. Judges have continued to see supervised or 
supported contact ‘as an extremely useful’ measure, especially in cases where there has 
been previous violence or alcoholism.37 However, there are outstanding questions as to 
the level of supervision and the safety of the child concerned.38
 
  
                                                 
33 Ibid para 31. 
34 Ibid para 36. 
35 Who on the father’s assertion had suffered 66 court hearings – see para 4.  
36 Ibid para 37. 
37 Perry, A. and Rainey, B. (2007) ‘Supervised, Supported and Indirect Contact Orders: 
Research Findings’ International Journal of Law, Policy and The Family Vol 21(1) 21-47 at 
p. 36.  
38 Ibid at p.37.  
